Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1982

Marsh v. Chambers
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marsh v. Chambers. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 100. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~~~;~

___

.La~~~
.....____.

~~~~

~~~~~
(~~~

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 27, 1982 Conference
Summer List 15, Sheet 3
No. 82-23-CFX
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MARSH,

~~
·
officials)

Cert to CA 8 (Heaney,
Stephenson & Oliver [DJ])

v.
CHAMBERS
(state legislator)
1.

SUMMARY:

Petr

Timely

Federal/Civil

challenges the Nebraska legislature's

practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a paid
chaplain.

____.......

2.

FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

The rules of the Nebraska
by the

legislature provide that a chaplain shall be s
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- 2 legislature

to

open

each

day's

session

with

a

prayer.

chaplain is to be compensated out of state funds.

The

For the past

sixteen years, the legislature has employed a single chaplain to
give the daily prayers.

The daily prayers have from time to time

been published in books and distributed at state expense.
Resp,
§1983

a member of the Nebraska legislature, brought this

action

claiming

that

Establishment Clause of
chaplain,

state

the

the 1st Arndt.

treasurer,

Executive Board, moved

above

and

practices
Petrs,

members

of

violate

the

the legislative

the

legislature's

to dismiss on the grounds of lOth Arndt

immunity, common-law legislative immunity, and general principles
of

federalism.

merits,

the

violated

by

DC
the

The DC
held

(Urbom, CJ)

that

practice

the
of

denied the motion.

Establishment
having

daily

On the

Clause

was

not

prayers,

but

was

violated by the compensation of the chaplain and the publication
of the prayers at state expense.
Petrs

appealed

from

the

compensation of the chaplain.

DC's

rulings

on

immunity

They did not appeal the portion of

the ruling prohibiting publication of the prayers.
appealed from the DC' s

and

Resp cross-

ruling permitting the daily prayers to

continue.
The CA 8 agreed that resp' s action was not barred by the
lOth Arndt,

by general federalism principles, or by legislative

immunity.

Nothing

u.s.

833

(1976),

in National League of Cities v. Usury,

426

suggests that the lOth Arndt immunizes states

from challenges based on the Bill of Rights.

Since there are no

pending state proceedings regarding the prayer practices, general

- 3 principles of federalism do not bar intervention by the federal
courts.

State legislators are

immune from §1983 suits to the

extent that members of Congress are immune under the Speech and
Debate Clause, Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446

u.s.

719

(1980), but the Speech and Debate Clause protects only

"legislative acts."

The prayers bear no relation to the process

of enacting legislation, and judicial intervention would have no
impact on the deliberative process of the legislature.
On the merits,
Bogen v. Doty,
legislative
Here,

598 F. 2d 1110

prayer

however,

the CA 8 followed

policy

the

CA

8

its prior decision in

(1979) , which held that not every

violates
found

the

Establishment

that Nebraska's

Clause.

prayer

policy

failed to satisfy the three-part test set forth in Committee for
Public Education v.

Nyquist,

prayers,

of

publishing

the

u.s.

413

prayer

756

books,

(1973).
and

The daily

appointment

and

compensation of the same chaplain for sixteen years, all formed
part of a single policy which must be viewed as a whole.
whole,

it

serves no secular

advancing

one

religious

purpose,

view,

and

As a

has a primary effect of

entangles

the

state

with

religion.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs renew the three immunity arguments

they made before the DC and CA.

They contend that the lOth Arndt

should

the

bar

this

suit,

because

relief

resp

claims

would

interfere with the Nebraska legislature's power to structure its
own internal affairs.
require

judicial

legislature's

Fundamental principles of federalism also

restraint

in

internal affairs.

suits

dealing

Moreover,

with

a

state

all of the acts of

- 4 which resp complains are "legislative acts" protected by commonlaw immunity.
On

the

merits,

petrs

contend

that

the CA 8' s

decision

directly conflicts with Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 392
N.E.2d 1195

(Mass. 1979).

Colo upheld a statute authorizing a

long-term, paid chaplain to open each day's legislative session
with a prayer.

Although Colo did not involve the publication of

prayer books, that issue was not properly before the CA 8 in this
case

because

petrs

had

not

appealed

the

DC's

ruling.

Petrs

discuss the importance of the issues raised, and refer this Court
to a

pending

challenge

to Congress'

chaplain.

See Murray v. Morton,

rev'd

nom.

sub

Murray

v.

practice of

505 F.Supp.

Buchanan,

674

F.2d

employing

144
14,

a

(DOC 1981),
petn

for

rehearing en bane granted, _ _ F.2d _ _ (CA DC 19 8 2 ) • l
Petrs also contend that the CA 8's decision was incorrect
under the Nyquist test.
this

Court

chaplain

have

would

In several prior decisions, members of

suggested
not

violate

that
the

employment

Establishment

School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374
id.

at 299-300

u.s.

421,

446

Clause.!!_, 343
Board

of

of

u.s.

a

legislative

Clause.

E.g.'

203, 213 (1963):

(Brennan, J., concurring): Engel v. Vitale,

370

(1962)

v.

u.s.

(Stewart,

306, 312

Education,

333

J.,

(1952):

u.s.

203,

dissenting):

zorach

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
253-54

(1948)

(Reed,

J.,

1 The CA DC is scheduled to hear oral argument en bane in Murray
on October 27, 1982. The DOC and theCA DC three-judge panel
have addressed only issues of standing and justiciability, and
not the merits of the Establishment Clause claim.

- 5 dissenting).
On the immunity issues, resp contends that the lOth Arndt
has no application to suits involving the Bill of Rights, since
the Bill of Rights places explicit limits on the states' powers.
Neither general principles of federalism nor common-law immunity
bars this suit, for the reasons given by the CA.
On the merits, resp contends that the CA' s holding was a
narrow one, applicable only to the facts

before it.

not

legislative

rule

on

the

constitutionality

of

The CA did
prayers

generally, or even paid legislative chaplains generally.

Petrs'

arguments address broad issues which are simply not raised by
this case.

Colo can be distinguished on the ground that the

state there had not printed any prayers at public expense.

Even

if Colo creates a conflict, it has not been followed by other
courts.

Finally,

the

CA

8 was

correct

in

deciding

that

Nebraska's policy violates the Establishment Clause.
4.

DISCUSSION
(a)

Immunity:

Petrs'

lOth

Arndt

argument

goes

far

beyond usury and subsequent lOth Arndt cases, which dealt only
with limitations on Congress' Commerce Clause power.

In City of

Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 156, 179-80 (1980), this Court
held that the lOth Arndt placed no limits Congress' powers to
enforce the 14th and 15th Amdts.

Resp seems clearly right in

arguing that the 1st Arndt, which explicitly limits state powers,
cannot itself be limited by the lOth Arndt.
Petrs' general federalism argument lacks merit.
.._____:-

Petrs do

not explain how general federalism principles are affected by the

- 6 federal courts'

exercise of jurisdiction in this case, nor do

they cite any case even suggesting that federalism principles
preclude jurisdiction.
State
situations

legislators
where

are

immune

from

suit

under

§1983

the Speech and Debate Clause would

members of Congress.

in

immunize

Consumers Union, 446 u.s. at 732-33; Tenney

v. Brandhove, 341 u.s. 367 (1951).

This immunity extends to acts

performed in the process of enacting legislation, or acts which
form part of the deliberative and communicative processes of the
legislature.
United

States

Gravel
v.

v.

United

Brewster,

408

States,
U.s.

408

501

U.S.

606

(1972).

(1972) ;

The

CA' s

conclusion that the hiring of a chaplain to give daily prayers is
not such an act seems entirely correct.

It does not conflict

with decisions of any other courts.
(b)

Establishment Clause:

The CA 8' s

conflict with that of the Mass. S.J.C. in Colo.

decision does
The issue seems

important enough to merit review by this Court, since all fifty
states as well as Congress apparently provide for
legislative prayer.
that

However,

the CA 8 reached

grounds.

In effect,

policy before

it was

some sort of

resp is correct in pointing out

its decision on the narrowest possible

the CA 8 said that the specific Nebraska
unconstitutional,

but a different result

might be reached under any other combination of circumstances.
The issues addressed by petrs would more properly be resolved in
a case that purports to announce a general rule.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

irnrnuni ty appear

The CA's rulings on petrs' claims of

to have been correct, and

raise no conflict.

- 7 Although the Establishment Clause issues are important and there
does appear to be a conflict, the CA' s
limited to its own facts.

ruling may have been

I therefore recommend denial.

There is a response.

August 6, 1982
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Michael F. Sturley

Question Presented
May the Nebraska Legislature, consistent with the Establishment Clause, retain and compensate a single Presbyterian minister as its chaplain for sixteen years?

Outline of Memorandum

I.

II.

III.

Background
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I.
A.

Background

Statutory Background
Under Rule 1, §2, of the Rules of the Nebraska Unicamer-

al,

the

Legislature

shall advise and consent to

its Executive

Board's recommendation on the appointment of a chaplain, who is
designated as one of the Legislature's officers.

His duties are

defined as follows:
The Chaplain shall attend and shall open with prayer
each day's sitting of the Legislature.
Nebraska Unicameral Rule 1, §21.

Rule 7(A), §l(b) also provides

that the "order of business of the Legislature" shall begin with
a "Prayer by the Chaplain."

B.

Facts
Petr Palmer is a Presbyterian minister in Lincoln, Ne-

braska.

In 1965, he was selected as the chaplain of the Nebraska

Legislature.
been

He has served in that capacity ever since, having

re-elected

session. 1

to

The State

the

position

at

the

(through petr Marsh,

beginning

of

each

the State Treasurer)

compensates Palmer at the rate of $320.00 per month.
Resp Chambers has been a member of the Nebraska Legislature since 1970.
prayers

that

He is not a Christian, and he objects to the

Palmer

delivers

1 only the 1979 election,
gyman, was contested.

at

the

opening of

each

sitting.

between Palmer and a Lutheran cler-

When he wishes to avoid being subjected to these prayers, he must
leave the legislative chamber when they are being delivered.
claims that this

interferes with his legislative duties,

much

business

legislative

is

conducted

immediately

He

since

before

the

sitting begins.
The parties have included samples of Palmer's prayers in
the Joint Appendix at pp. 92-108.
inational

___

in the narrow sense.

The earlier ones are nondenomAlthough they are unmistakably

Christian
....., (with a definite Protestant tone), they are not identifiably Presbyterian.

The later ones seem nondenominational in a

slightly broader sense.
common

Explicit Christian references are less

(even though the tone remains distinctly Christian), and

Judaism is recognized.

Nevertheless, the prayers remain clearly

witn1n the Judec-Christian framework.

They are implicitly incon-

sistent with the religious beliefs of Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists,
etc., and explicitly inconsistent with the principles of atheism
and agnosticism. 2

c.

Decisions Below
Chambers challenged the legislative prayer practices in

DC

(D.Neb.:

Urbom).

The DC concluded that the practice of hold-

ing prayers at the beginning of each day did not violate the Establishment Clause.

It reasoned

that

"what a

legislature does

2 rn 1975, 1978, and 1979, several hundred copies of the prayers were printed and distributed at state expense. The State no
longer defends the constitutionality of that practice, so it appears that it is not an issue before this Court.

for and by itself with no significant impact on anyone else" is
not law-making within the scope of the Establishment Clause.

The

fact that there had been a single chaplain of a single faith for
sixteen years did not alter

this conclusion.

The DC held that

the publication of the prayers and the paying of the chaplain,
however, did violate the Establishment Clause.

Here the legisla-

ture was expending public funds on a religious purpose--the very
activity that the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent.
The State did not appeal the DC's ruling prohibiting the
publication

----

issue.

of

the

It

prayers.

did

appeal

compensation

--,

Chambers cross-appealed that portion of the judgment that

permitted Palmer to continue as the chaplain.
phenson, Oliver [Sr DJ; WD Mo])
part.

the

It declared

violates

the

that

(Heanev, Ste-

affirmed in part and reversed in

not every

Establishment

CAB

Clause.

legislative prayer
But

on

the

facts

practice
of

this

case, Nebraska had gone too far in retaining and compensating a
single Presbyterian minister as its chaplain for sixteen years.
This practice,

viewed as a whole,

--

Public Education &

u.s.

773

failed to satisfy the three-

part test of your opinion in Committee
Religious Liberty v.
Lemon v.

Kurtzman,

Nyquist,

403

u.s.

413

for

756,

602, 612-613

(1971)).

(1973)

(citing

It serves no

secular purpose, has a primary effect of advancing one religious
view, and entangles the State with religion.

II.
A.

Discussion

General Observations and Disclaimer
I must confess that I have

~~~

som~:ouble

parties are so excited about this case.

~

seeing why the

Even if Chambers is a

non-Christian, Palmer's pravers do not seem so offensive that it
is worth the effort of bringing a lawsuit to the Supreme Court.
This is not a case

in which impressionable young children are

being forced against their will to attend proselytizing prayer
sessions as part of their public school classes.
School District v. Schempp, 374
370 U.S.
U.S.

421

u.s.

Cf. Abington

203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,

(1962); Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners,
(1983)

(POWELL, J., in chambers).

I assume that the

Nebraska senators are all mature adults who are perfectly capable
of deciding their religious beliefs for themselves.

Anyone who

does not share Palmer's beliefs is unlikely to be convinced by
his two-minute prayers.

Even if the prayers are unconstitution-

al, I would think it would be easier to ignore them than to bring
this lawsuit. 3

But it appears that Chambers is offended by the

prayers, and believes very strongly that he should not be subjected to them in the legislative chamber.
I find it harder to apologize for the State's actions.
Even if the Nebraska Legislature were entitled to begin each sitting with a prayer, why does it insist on asserting this right

3Perhaps this is merely an indication of my non-litigious
nature. I probably would not think it worth the effort of bringing a lawsuit if the Nebraska Legislature began each day with two
minutes of pornographic films.

!

..
when it knows that at least one 4 of its members is deeply offended

by

the

It strikes me as

practice?

a matter of common

courtesy, entirely independent of constitutional law, that those
senators who wish to pray together

should do so at a time and

place that will not offend Chambers.

I cannot believe that the

purported secular purpose is the real reason for defending this
lawsuit,

let alone for petitioning this Court for cert.

If all

the Legislature wanted were "a brief, solemn and thoughtful act
in a traditional manner" to bring the assembly to order, Petrs'
Brief 27, it easily could provide for a secular ceremony, such as
reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance."
motives

in

this

I am convinced that petrs'

suit are closely related

to their belief that

prayer and religion are good things that should form a part of
all of our activities.

While I

am sure that these beliefs are

just as firmly and genuinely held as Chambers's beliefs, they are
also clearly religious.

It is

ironic,

but the best proof that

petrs have a weak defense is their vigorous action in defending
the suit.
As the heading suggests,
reasons.

I write this section for

two

Birst, I do not think this case is important enough to

be worth the Court's time.
Court's docket

Given the vocal complaints about the

from some of the Justices who voted to grant,

I

think a DIG would be the best course. But you voted to deny, so
..............
'~--Second, you
my complaints are directed to the wrong quarter.

4 There is some suggestion that a Jewish senator also has objected to Palmer's prayers.

1

should know that I do not
or the other.

Although

I

are being pretty silly.
prior

cases,

strongly about this case one way

but

think both sides

Reversal would be inconsistent with the

it would

be

an

inconsistency

that

the

Court

could tolerate.

B.

The Historical Argument
As in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, No. 81-1350,

the Government argues that questionable official actions are consistent with the Bill of Rights because the First Congress accepted them.

We agreed in Villamonte-Marquez that the First Con-

gress's practice was strong evidence, but it could not be dispositive.

The same Congress, after all, explicitly authorized pun- -.-

--

ishments that today would violate the Eighth Amendment, and the
same Congress

Even the statute at issue in

'----------------------~
Villamonte-Marquez,
while constitutional

in

its application

ocean-going vessels near the coast, is probably inconsistent
the

Fourth

Amendment

to

the

extent

it

purports

to

the

~

-

wit ~

authorize

suspicionless searches of pleasure boats on inland rivers.
thermore,

to

I~'
£z4-

Fur-

type of analysis urged by the Government was re-

jected by the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,

489

(1954).

The Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment

had specifically provided for segregated schools in the District
of Columbia.
The

Establishment

Clause

in

general,

and

legislative

prayer in particular, is an area where very little weight can be
placed

on

the

eighteenth-century

historical

practice.

On

the

',

general point, eighteenth-century society was very different from
today' s

7

society.

Virtually everyone then was a Christian, ' and

most were Protestants.

So long as a legislative chaplain did not

espouse views of one sect that were
another

sect,

there

was

minority

whose

rights

were

being

Today's society is much more pluralis- r-~

abridged by the majority.
tic.

no

inconsistent with views of

There are significant numbers of atheists,

members of non-Christian religions.

agnostics,

and

It is probably impossible to

have a chaplain who could deliver prayers, as we generally understand the term,

that are not inconsistent with the views of at

least the atheists and agnostics.

Thus the overwhelming changes

in social conditions make the eighteenth-century practice of little direct relevance in this area.
On

the

specific~ ighteenth-century

again not very helpful.

~ imself,

beliefs

are

who drafted the First

Amendment, believed that legislative chaplaincies were inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
he

described

rights,

the

practice

as

"a

In his "Detached Memoranda,"
~

palpable

violation

as well as of Constitutional principles." 5

of

equal

One cannot

say that there was a clear recognition by the relevant Framers
that the First Amendment would allow legislative chaplains, even
in the eighteenth century.

5 Thi s document is reprinted as an appendix to the amicus
brief of Murray, et al. This brief also discusses the historical
arguments in some detail at pp. 5-16.
If you find these arguments significant, you should certainly read it.

f

C.

The Purpose-Effect-Entanglement Test
Over the years, the Court has developed a "well-defined

three-part test," Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.

Nyquist,

413 U.S.

756,

the Establishment Clause.

77'?.

(1973),

to judge laws under

As you explained in Nyquist:

[T]o pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law
in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, second, must have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and,
third, must avoid excessive government entanglement
with religion.
Id., at 773
Kurtzman,

(citations and footnote omitted); see also Lemon v.

403

U.S.

602,

612-613

The Lemon Court also

(1971).

identified "the three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection:

'sponsorship, financial

support,

sovereign

and

activity.'"

u.s.

active
Id.,

involvement of

at

612

the

(quoting Walz v.

in

religious

Tax Commission,

397

664' 668 (1970)).
The first step is to identify the practices that must be

judged against these criteria.

I agree with CAB that it is nee-

essary to examine the Nebraska scheme as a whole.
compensation is a
little

sense

for

Although the

factor weighing against the system,

it makes

this Court to say that everything except the

compensation can continue.

In any event, the DC's rationale for

excluding the prayers themselves from the scope of the Establishment Clause is specious.

The DC reasoned that the Legislature

was not making a law in having the prayers,
not affect anyone outside the Legislature.
and Rule

7 (A) ,

§

1 (b),

are clearly

for the prayers did
But Rule 1, §§2, 21,

legislative enactments

that

V(7

/} ..~ ~~- t

tv'require compliance.
of the Legislature
symbolic

effect),

jects to them. 6
norities

Even if they did not

ffect

(a questionable assum tion,

I

~

•

an~ outside

in view of their

they affect Chambers -and he strenuously obThe Pirst Amendment

from the

improper power of

of a group of individuals, the DC misses

designed to protect mimajority.

In treating

his fundamental princi-

M~~

ple.
Looking at the

my

tion of equal rights, as well as of
Chambers sincerely believes, as a religious matter,
prayers are wrong.

Palmer's

The Pirst Amendment prohibits the

forcing the majority's inconsistent religious views upon him.
making the prayers an integral part of the legislative

By <)~

proces ~

and by holding them at a key time in the da , the State is presenting Chambers with an impermissible choice: stay in the chamber and be subjected to religious statements by a state officer,
or leave the chamber and be a less effective representative.

It

does not matter that Chambers is a member of a small minority, or
that the majority not only tolerate but applaud the prayers.

It

is minorities such as this that the Pirst Amendment was designed

6 under the DC' s reasoning, the population as a whole could
decree by referendum that no Republican newspapers may be published. The DC's rationale would say that this is not subject to
the Pirst Amendment because it is not a law, and it is not a law
because it does not affect anyone other than the body who passed
it by a majority vote.

to protect.
and pray,

The majority are free, of course, to meet together

but

they must do so at

a time that does not burden

Chamber's First Amendment rights.
In my

view,

the

State's prayer

practices violate all

three prongs of the purpose-effect-entanglement test and suffer
from all of the evils

identified in Lemon.

inherently religious.

Palmer's prayers in particular are indis-

putably religious.

Holding prayers is

The State's purported secular purpose could

be achieved just as easily by reciting the "Pledge of Allegiance"
or hearing a lay person's two-minute philosophical talk that made
no meaningful reference to God.
cy is also religious.

The effect of the Nebraska poli-

The passions that this case inflames are

clearly religious on both sides.

The vocal opponents of state-

sponsored prayers do not object to "brief, solemn and thoughtful
act [ s] ";

they

object

to the

religious

aspects of the prayers.

And the vocal supporters of state-sponsored prayers are motivated
by their sincere religious beliefs.
lief

in God and support of

They are convinced that be-

religious

activities are among the

pillars of America's greatness, 7 and that we should all conduct
ourselves accordingly.

Finally, a long-term relationship between

the Legislature and a paid clergyman has the effect of entangling
\\

the government in religion.

Every day a ~~ eligious ceremony is an

inherent part of the legislative program.

7 These views are probably right, but respect for dissenting
minorities is another pillar of America's greatness.
Thus the
First Amendment prohibits the religious majority from imposing
its views on people like Chambers.

.

.

In sum, I find it very difficult to reconcile a legislative chaplain with the Establishment Clause in today's pluralistic

society.

If Palmer could compose "prayers"

in such a way

that they do not express meaningfulS religious views inconsistent
with Chambers's, there would be no problem.

But that would have

the effect of making Palmer something other than a chaplain, and
his daily speeches something other than "prayers."

D.

The Procedural Posture of the Case
I can understand why the Court would prefer, on politi-

cal grounds, to avoid ruling on legislative prayer as a general
matter.

A vocal portion of the population would like to impose

7
I

its religious views on the country as a whole, and this group is
well

represented

in

the other

two branches of the government.

Fortunately the present case does not require such a broad ruling.

CAS held that legislative prayers are not per se violations

of the Establishment Clause, but that Nebraska had gone too far
in its practices here.

CAS's judgment left Nebraska free to for-

mulate some other plan that would continue to incorporate prayer

8 r do not think that a reference to God necessarily leads to
an Establishment Clause violation.
Many references have become
so commonplace that they have lost any real religious meaning.
If Nebraska were to adopt my suggestion, for example, and recite
the "Pledge of Allegiance" each morning, it would not violate the
Establishment Clause to include the phrase "under God" that is
part of the pledge.
Similarly, I see no problem with this
Court's Marshal declaring "God save the United States and this
honorable Court" at the beginning of each session.
The phrase
"In God we trust" on our money is in the same category.
The
problem in Nebraska is that Palmer's prayers are designed to be
meaningful, religious statements.

"6t--

into its legislative program.
review of that judgment.

Chambers did not cross-petn for

The Court could thus affirm the judg-

ment without expressing a view on legislative prayer as a general
matter,

but concluding

that

there was

an Establishment Clause

violation on the facts of this case.

III.
The decision

below

Conclusion
should

be

affirmed.

Prayer

is

an

inherently religious activity, and the prayers here were clearly
religious.

When a State conducts meaningful prayers as part of

its official governmental
ment Clause.

functions,

it violates the Establish-

The Court may wish to hold, however, merely that

Nebraska violated the Establishment Clause on the extreme facts
of this case.

~
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-23
FRANK MARSH, STATE TREASURER, ET AL.,
PETITIONER v. ERNEST CHAMBERS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1983]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The question presented is whether the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State violates the Establishment
Clause.
I
The Nebraska Legislature begins each of its sessions with
a prayer offered by a chaplain who is chosen biennially by the
Executive Board of the Legislative Council and paid out of
public funds. 1 Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister,
has served as chaplain since 1965 at a salary of $319.75 per
inonth for each month the legislature is in session.
Ernest Chambers is a member of the Nebraska Legislature
and a taxpayer of Nebraska. Claiming that the Nebraska
Legislature's chaplaincy practice violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, he brought this action under
42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the pracRules of the Nebraska Unicameral, Rules 1, 2, and 21. These prayers
are recorded in the Legislative Journal and, upon the vote of the Legislature, collected from time to time into prayerbooks, which are published at
the public expense. In 1975, 200 copies were printed, in 1978 (200 copies),
and 1979 (100 copies). In total, publication costs amounted to $458.56.
1
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tice. 2 After denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of
legislative immunity, the District Court held that the Establishment Clause was not breached by the prayers, but was
violated by paying the chaplain from public funds. It therefore enjoined the the Legislature from using public funds to
pay the chaplain, but declined to enjoin the policy of beginning sessions with prayers. Cross-appeals were taken. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected arguments that the case should be dismissed on Tenth Amendment, legislative immunity, standing or federalism grounds.
On the merits of the chaplaincy issue, the court refused to
treat respondent's challenges as separable issues in the manner of the District Court. Instead, the Court of Appeals assessed the practice as a whole because "[p]arsing out [the]
elements" would lead to "an incongruous result." 675 F. 2d
228, 233 (CA8 1982). Applying the three-part test of Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), as set out in
Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U. S. 756, 773 (1973), the court held that the chaplaincy
practice violated all three elements of the test: the purpose
and primary effect of selecting the same minister for 16 years
and publishing his prayers was to promote a particular religious expression; use of state money for compensation and
publication led to entanglement. 675 F. 2d, at 234-235. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals modified the District Court's
injunction and prohibited the State from engaging in any aspect of its established chaplaincy practice.
We granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the prac2
Respondent named as defendants State Treasurer Frank Marsh,
Chaplain Palmer, and the members of the Executive Board of the Legislative Council in their official capacity. All appear as petitioners before us.
3
The District Court also enjoined the State from using public funds to
publish the prayers holding that this practice violated the Establishment
Clause. Petitioners have represented to us that they did not challenge
this facet of the District Court's decision, Tr. of Oral Arg. 1!~20. Accordingly, no issue as to publishing these prayers is before us.
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tice of opening sessions with prayers by a State-employed
clergyman,-- U.S.-- (1982), and we reverse. 4
II

The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the
history of this country. From colonial times through the
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. In the very courtrooms in
which the District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard
and decided this case, the proceedings opened with a court
attendant's announcement that concluded, "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court."
The tradition in many of the colonies was, of course, linked
to an established church, 5 but the Continental Congress
• Petitioners also sought review of their Tenth Amendment, federalism
and immunity claims. They did not, however, challenge the Court of Appeals' decision as to standing and we agree that Chambers, as a member of
the Legislature and as a taxpayer whose taxes are used to fund the chaplaincy, has standing to assert this claim.
5
The practice in colonies with established churches is, of course, not dispositive of the legislative prayer question. The history of Virginia is instructive, however, because that colony took the lead in defining religious
rights. In 1776, the Virginia Convention adopted a Declaration of Rights
that included, as Article 16, a guarantee of religious liberty that is considered the precursor of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, A Documentary History 231-236 (1971);
S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America, 491-492 (1970) (hereinafter Cobb). Virginia was also among the first to disestablish its church.
Both before and after disestablishment, however, Virginia followed the
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer. See e. g., J. of the
House of Burgesses 34 (Nov. 20, 1712); Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Va. 470 (June 2, 1788) (ratification convention); J. of the
House of Delegates of Va. 3 (June 24, 1788) (state legislature).
Rhode Island's experience mirrored that of Virginia. That colony was
founded by Roger Williams, who was among the first of his era to espouse
the principle of religious freedom. Cobb, at 426. As early as 1641, its

.·

82-23-0PINION
4

MARSH v. CHAMBERS

adopted the traditional procedure of opening its sessions with
a prayer offered by a paid chaplain, see e. g., 1 J. of the Continental Cong. 26 (1774); 2 J. of the Continental Cong. 12
(1775); 5 J. of the Continental Cong. 530 (1776); 6 J. of the
Continental Cong. 887 (1776); 27 J. of the Continental Cong.
683 (1784). See also 1 A. Stokes, Church and State in the
United States 448-450 (1950) (hereinafter Stokes). Although invocations were not offered during the Constitutional Convention, 6 the First Congress, as one of its early
items of business, also adopted the policy of selectfng a chaplain to open each session with prayer. Thus, on April 7,
1789, the Senate appointed a committee "to take under consideration the manner of electing Chaplains." J. of the Sen.
10. On April 9, 1789, a similar committee was appointed by
the House of Representatives. On April 25, 1789, the Senate elected its first chaplain, J. of the Sen. 16; the House followed suit on May 1, 1789, J. of the H. R. 26. A statute providing for the payment of these chaplains was enacted into
law on Sept. 22, 1789. 2 Annals of Cong. 2180; 1 Stat. 71. 7
Legislature provided for liberty of conscience. Id., at 430. Yet thesessions of its ratification convention, like Virginia's, began with prayers,
see W. Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, 1765-1790 668
(1971) (reprinting May 26, 1790 minutes of the convention).
• History suggests that this may simply have been an oversight. At
one point, Benjamin Franklin suggested "that henceforth prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held
in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business." 1 M.
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 452 (1911). His proposal was rejected not because the Convention was opposed to prayer, but
because it was thought that a mid-stream adoption of the policy would
highlight prior omissions and because "(t]he Convention had no funds."
Ibid.; see also Stokes, at 455-456.
'It bears note that James Madison, one of the principal advocates of
religious freedom in the colonies and a drafter of the Establishment Clause,
see, e. g., Cobb, supra, at 495-497; Stokes, supra, at 537-552, was one of
those appointed to undertake this task by the House of Representatives, J.
of the H. R. 11-12; Stokes, at 541-549, and voted for the bill authorizing
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It is significant that on Sept. 25, 1789, three days after
Congress authorized the appointment of a paid chaplain, final
agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights,
J. of the Sen. 88; J. of the H. R. 121. 8 The practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption
ever since that early session of Congress. 9 The practice has
also been followed consistently in a great many states, 10 inpayment of the chaplains, 1 Annals of Cong. 891.
8
Interestingly, Sept. 25, 1789 was also the day that the House resolved
to request the President to set aside a Thanksgiving Day to acknowledge
"the many signal favors of Almighty God," J. of the H. R. 123. See also J.
of the Sen. 88.
9
The chaplaincy was challenged in the 1850's by "sundry petitions praying Congress to abolish the office of chaplain," S. Rep. No. 376, 32d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1853). After consideration by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, the Senate decided that the practice did not violate the Establishment Clause, reasoning that a rule permitting Congress to elect chaplains is not a law establishing a national church and that the chaplaincy was
no different from Sunday Closing Laws, which the Senate thou h le
constitutional. In addition, the Senate reasoned since prayer was said by
the very Congress that adopted the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers
could not have intended the First Amendment to forbid legislative prayer
or viewed prayer as a step toward an established church. !d., at~. In
any event, the 35th Congress abandoned the practice of electing chaplains
in favor of inviting local clergy to officiate, see Cong. Globe, 35th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14, 27-28 (1857). Elected chaplains were reinstituted by the
36th Congress, Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1859); id., at 1016
(1860).
10
See Brief of the Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae. Although most state legislatures begin their sessions with prayer,
most do not have a formal rule requiring this procedure. But see, e. g.,
Alaska State Leg. Uniform Rule 11 and 17 (19??) (providing for opening
invocation); Ark. Rules of Sen 18 (1983); Colo. Legislator's Handbook,
House of Rep. Rule 44 (1982); Idaho Rules of the H. R. and Joint Rules 2
and 4 (1982); Ind. H. R. Rule 10 (1983); Idaho, Standing Rules and Order
for the Gov't of the Sen Rule 4(a); Kan., Rules of the Sen. 4 (1983); Kan.,
Rules of the H. R. 103 (1983); Ky. Gen'l Ass. H. Res. 2 (1982); La. Rules of
Order, Sen. Rule 10.1 (1983); La. Rules of Order, House Rule 8.1 (1982);
Me. Sen. and House Register, Rules of the House 4 (1983); Md., Sen. and
House of Delegates Rules 1 (19??); N. H. Manual for the Use of the Gen'l

~
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eluding Nebraska, where the institution of opening legislative sessions with prayer was adopted even before the State
attained statehood, Nebraska Journal of the Council at the
First Regular Session of the General Assembly 16 (Jan. 22,
1855).

do

nud- ~

Historical patterns alone, of courseJafford -B\) basi~ ~
temporary violations of constitutionar limits, bi:irtllere is far
-.....
more here than simply a pattern of over two centuries. The
intent of the draftsmen and of the First Congress is far
weightier evidence of the accepted meaning of the Establishment Clause than the views of those who came thereafter.
In Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U. S. 664, 678 (1970), we considered the weight to be accorded to history:
"It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long
use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast
aside."
No more is Nebraska's practice of more than a century, consistent with Congressional practice, to be cast aside. It
cannot be that in the same week that Members of Congress
voted to appoint~d to pay a Chaplain for each House and also
voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for subCourt of N. H., Rules of the House 52 (a) (1981); N. D. Sen. and House
Rules 101 and 310 (19??); Ore. Rules of Sen 4.01 (1983); Ore. Rules of H. R.
401 (1983) (opening session only); Pa. H. R. Rule 17 (19??); Pa. Sen. Rule
XI (1) (19??); S. D. Official Directory and Rules of theSen. and H. R. Joint
Rules of the Sen. and House 4-1 (1983); Tenn. Permanent Rules of Order of
the Sen. 6 (1981-1982) (provides for admission into Sen. chamber of the
"Chaplain of the Day''); Tex. Rules of the H. R. 6 (1983); Utah Rules of the
State Sen. and H. R. 4.04 (1983); Va. Manual ofthe Sen. and House of Delegates, Rules of the Sen. 21(a) (1982) (session opens with "period of devotions"); Wash. Permanent Rules of the H. R. 15 (1983); Wyo. Rules of the
Sen. 4-1 (1983); Wyo. Rules of the H. R. 2-1 (1983). See also, Mason's
Manual of Legislative Procedure § 586(2) (1979).

Cf

~

f
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mission to the States, that they meant one Clause of that
Amendment to forbid that which they had just declared acceptable. In applying the First Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), it would be incongruous to interpret its provisions as imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the States than the draftsmen imposed on the
Federal Government. It is this unique history which led the
District Judge in this case to hold that the entanglement test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, surpra, was not violated by legislative prayer.
RespondenU argu~that we should not rely too heavily on
"the advice of the Founding Fathers," Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 237 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), because the messages of history often tend to be
ambiguous and not relevant to a society far more heterogeneous than that of the Framers, id., at 240. On this score,
respondent points out that John Jay and John Rutledge opposed the motion to begin the first session of the Continental
Congress with prayer. Brief for Respondent 60. 11 We do
not agree that evidence of opposition to a measure weakens
the historical argument; indeed it strengthens it by demonstrating that the subject was considered carefully and the action not taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tradition and
without regard to the problems posed by a pluralistic society.
Jay and Rutledge specifically grounded their objection on the
fact that the delegates "were so divided in religious sentiments . . . that [they] could not join in the same act of
worship." Their objection was overcome by Samuel Adams,
It also could be noted that objections to prayer were raised, apparently successfully, in Pennsylvania while ratification of the Constitution
was debated, Penn. Herald, Nov. 24, 1787, and that in the 1820s, Madison
expressed doubts concerning the chaplaincy practice. See, L. Pfeffer,
Church State and Freedom 248-249 (rev. ed. 1967), quoting E. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," III William and Mary Quarterly 558-559
(1946).
11
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who stated that "he was no bigot, and could hear a prayer
from a gentleman of piety and virtue, who was at the same
time a friend to his country." C. Adams, Familiar Letters of
John Adams and his Wife, Abigail Adams, during the Revolution 37-38, reprinted in Stokes, at 449. This interchange
emphasizes that the early legislators did not consider opening
prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing
the government's "official seal of approval on one religious
view" cf. 675 F. 2d, at 234. Rather, the Founding Fathers
looked at invocations merely as "conduct whose . . . effect
... harmonize[d] with the tenets of some or all religions."
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961).
The Establishment Clause does not always bar a state from
regulating conduct simply because it "harmonizes with religious canons." !d., at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
And this is especially true where, as here, the individual
claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not
readily susceptible to "religious indoctrination," see Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 686 (1971); Colo v. Treasurer
& Receiver Gen'l, 392 N. E. 2d 1195, 1200 (Mass. 1979), or
peer pressure, compare, Abington, supra, 374 U. S., at 290
(BRENNAN, J., concurring).
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken histo of more
than 200 years, there can e no ou
a t e practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has, like the Sunday
Closing Laws upheld in McGowan, become part of the fabric
of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not an "establishment" of
religion, but a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely
held in this country. As Justice Douglas observed, "[w]e are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 (1952).

III
We turn then to the question of whether any features of
the Nebraska practice violate the Establishment Clause.
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Beyond the bare fact that a prayer is offered, three points
have been made: first, that a clergyman of only one denomination-Presbyterian-has been selected for 16 years; 12 second, that the chaplain is paid at public expense; and third,
that the prayers are in the J udeo-Christian tradition. 13
Weighed against. the historical background, these factors do
not serve to invalidate Nebraska's practice. 14
The Court of Appeals was concerned that Palmer's long
tenure has the effect of giving preference to his religious
views. We, no more than Members of the Congresses of this
century, can perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination advances the beliefs of a particular
church. 15 To the contrary, the evidence indicates that
Palmer was reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him. 16
12
In comparison, the First Congress provided for the appointment of
two chaplains of different denominations who would alternate between the
two chambers on a weekly basis, J. of the Sen. 12; J. of the H. R. 16.
13
Palmer characterizes his prayers as "nonsectarian," "Judeo Christian,"
and with "elements of the American civil religion." App. 75 and 87. (Deposition of Robert E. Palmer). Although some of his earlier prayers were
often explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all references to Christ after a
1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator. /d., at 49.
"It is also claimed that Nebraska's practice of collecting the prayers into
books violates the First Amendment. Because the State did not appeal
the District Court order enjoining further publications, see n. 3, supra,
this issue is not before us and we express no opinion on it.
" We note that Dr. Edward L. R. Elson, served as Chaplain of the Senate of the United States from January 1969 to February 1981, a period of
12 years; Dr. Frederick Brown Harris served from February 1949 to January 1969, a period of 20 years. Senate Library, Chaplains of the Federal
Government (rev. 1982).
•• Nebraska's practice is consistent with the manner in which the First
Congress viewed its chaplains. Reports contemporaneous with the elections reported only the chaplains' names, and not their religions or church
affiliations, see, e. g., II Gazette of the U. S. 18 (April25, 1789); V Gazette
of the U. S. 18 (April27, 1789) (listing nominees for chaplain of the House);
VI Gazette of the U.S. 23 (May 1, 1789). See also S. Rep. 376, supra, at
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Palmer was not the only clergyman heard by the Legislature;
several guest chaplains have officiated at the request of various legislators and as substitutes during Palmer's absences.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. Absent proof that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself violate the Establishment Clause.
Nor is the compensation of the chaplain from public funds a
reason to invalidate the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy;
remuneration is grounded in historic practice initiated, as we
noted earlier, ante, at - - , by the same Congress that
adopted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The Continental Congress paid its chaplain, see e. g., 6 J. of
the Continental Cong. 887 (1776), as did some of the states,
see e. g., Debates and other Proceedings of the Convention of
Va. 470 (June 26, 1788). Currently, many state legislatures
and the United States Congress provide for the compensation
of their chaplains, Brief for Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae 3; 2 U. S. C. §§ 61d and 84-2;
H. R. Res. 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 17 Nebraska has
paid its chaplain for well over a century, see 1867 Neb. Laws
§§ 2-4 (June 21, 1867), reprinted in, Neb. Gen'l Stat. 459
(1873). The content of the Nebraska prayers is not, and can3.
11

The states' practices differ widely. Like Nebraska, several states
choose a chaplain who serves for the entire legislative session. In other
states, the prayer is offered by a different clergyman each day. Under
either system, some states pay their chaplains and others do not. For
states providing for compensation statutorily or by resolution, see, e. g.,
Cal. Gov't Code Ann.§§ 9170, 9171, 9320 and Sen. Res. No.6 (1983); Colo.
House J., 54th Gen. Ass. 17-19 (Jan. 5, 1983); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-9
(1982); Geo. H. R. Res. No. 3(1)(e) (1983); Geo. S. Res. No. 3(1)(r)(1983);
Iowa Code § 2.11 (1983); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 21.150 (1969) (West); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 218.200 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:11-2 (1970) (West); N. M. Stat.
Ann. Const. Art. IV § 9 (1978); Okla. Stat. Tit. 74, §§ 291.12 and 292.1
(West Supp. 1982); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 2, § 19 (1982 Supp.); Wise. Stat.
§ 13.125 (1982 Supp.).
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not be, of concern to us. iThe sincerity of those who, like respondent, entertain concerns such as those raised here cannot be doubted; the concern is that if prayer in this context is
permitted, it can be the beginning of the establishment the
Founding Fathers feared. But Justice Goldberg, concurring
in Abington, 374 U. S., at 308, aptly disposed of this fear:
"It is of course true that great consequences can grow
from small beginnings, but the measure of constitutional
adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish
between real threat and mere shadow."
The unbroken practice in the National Congress and Nebraska gives abundant assurance that there is no "real
threat" here, at least not "while this Court sits," Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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